A model of delegation in bargaining
| buir.advisor | Karagözoğlu, Emin | |
| dc.contributor.author | Doğan, Gökçe | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2023-07-14T10:30:49Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2023-07-14T10:30:49Z | |
| dc.date.copyright | 2023-06 | |
| dc.date.issued | 2023-06 | |
| dc.date.submitted | 2023-07-11 | |
| dc.department | Department of Economics | |
| dc.description | Cataloged from PDF version of article. | |
| dc.description | Thesis (Master's): Bilkent University, Department of Economics, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, 2023. | |
| dc.description | Includes bibliographical references (leaves 81-83). | |
| dc.description.abstract | This thesis examines delegate selection in bargaining encounters where one side consists of a group. Employing a non-cooperative approach, we propose a three stage bargaining game to analyze the trade-off that arises between the group’s share of the surplus and the distribution within the group when a delegate holds a privileged position in the in-group bargaining stage. We show that there exist multiple equilibria and characterize them. We explore the trade-off by taking into account various delegate selection methods, individuals’ time preferences, and in-group bargaining institutions. Our findings demonstrate that differences in these factors lead to substantial changes in equilibrium strategies. Specifically, under majority rule, granting a delegate the first proposer right in in-group bargaining results in an increase in the number of equilibria in which a weaker group member is elected, whereas a unanimity requirement leads to a stronger group member being preferred as the delegate in most of the equilibria. Furthermore, we illustrate that group members’ discount factors are another important determinant of delegate selection. | |
| dc.description.degree | M.A. | |
| dc.description.statementofresponsibility | by Gökçe Doğan | |
| dc.format.extent | x, 83 leaves : illustrations, charts ; 30 cm. | |
| dc.identifier.itemid | B162218 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/11693/112415 | |
| dc.language.iso | English | |
| dc.publisher | Bilkent University | |
| dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | |
| dc.subject | Out-group bargaining | |
| dc.subject | In-group bargaining | |
| dc.title | A model of delegation in bargaining | |
| dc.title.alternative | Pazarlıkta delegasyon modeli | |
| dc.type | Thesis |