A model of delegation in bargaining

buir.advisorKaragözoğlu, Emin
dc.contributor.authorDoğan, Gökçe
dc.date.accessioned2023-07-14T10:30:49Z
dc.date.available2023-07-14T10:30:49Z
dc.date.copyright2023-06
dc.date.issued2023-06
dc.date.submitted2023-07-11
dc.departmentDepartment of Economics
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of article.
dc.descriptionThesis (Master's): Bilkent University, Department of Economics, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, 2023.
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (leaves 81-83).
dc.description.abstractThis thesis examines delegate selection in bargaining encounters where one side consists of a group. Employing a non-cooperative approach, we propose a three stage bargaining game to analyze the trade-off that arises between the group’s share of the surplus and the distribution within the group when a delegate holds a privileged position in the in-group bargaining stage. We show that there exist multiple equilibria and characterize them. We explore the trade-off by taking into account various delegate selection methods, individuals’ time preferences, and in-group bargaining institutions. Our findings demonstrate that differences in these factors lead to substantial changes in equilibrium strategies. Specifically, under majority rule, granting a delegate the first proposer right in in-group bargaining results in an increase in the number of equilibria in which a weaker group member is elected, whereas a unanimity requirement leads to a stronger group member being preferred as the delegate in most of the equilibria. Furthermore, we illustrate that group members’ discount factors are another important determinant of delegate selection.
dc.description.degreeM.A.
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Gökçe Doğan
dc.format.extentx, 83 leaves : illustrations, charts ; 30 cm.
dc.identifier.itemidB162218
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11693/112415
dc.language.isoEnglish
dc.publisherBilkent University
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.subjectOut-group bargaining
dc.subjectIn-group bargaining
dc.titleA model of delegation in bargaining
dc.title.alternativePazarlıkta delegasyon modeli
dc.typeThesis
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