A model of delegation in bargaining

This thesis examines delegate selection in bargaining encounters where one side consists of a group. Employing a non-cooperative approach, we propose a three stage bargaining game to analyze the trade-off that arises between the group’s share of the surplus and the distribution within the group when a delegate holds a privileged position in the in-group bargaining stage. We show that there exist multiple equilibria and characterize them. We explore the trade-off by taking into account various delegate selection methods, individuals’ time preferences, and in-group bargaining institutions. Our findings demonstrate that differences in these factors lead to substantial changes in equilibrium strategies. Specifically, under majority rule, granting a delegate the first proposer right in in-group bargaining results in an increase in the number of equilibria in which a weaker group member is elected, whereas a unanimity requirement leads to a stronger group member being preferred as the delegate in most of the equilibria. Furthermore, we illustrate that group members’ discount factors are another important determinant of delegate selection.