Large tullock contests
| buir.contributor.author | Doğan, Serhat | |
| buir.contributor.author | Karagözoğlu, Emin | |
| buir.contributor.author | Sağlam, Çağrı | |
| buir.contributor.orcid | Karagözoğlu, Emin|0000-0003-2442-6949 | |
| dc.citation.epage | 179 | en_US |
| dc.citation.issueNumber | 2 | |
| dc.citation.spage | 169 | |
| dc.citation.volumeNumber | 140 | |
| dc.contributor.author | Doğan, Serhat | |
| dc.contributor.author | Karagözoğlu, Emin | |
| dc.contributor.author | Sağlam, Çağrı | |
| dc.contributor.author | Keskin, K. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-03-11T10:29:28Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2024-03-11T10:29:28Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2023-05-25 | |
| dc.department | Department of Economics | |
| dc.description.abstract | We characterize the equilibrium effort function of a large Tullock contest game with heterogeneous agents under mild conditions on the contest success function and effort cost function. Later, writing the equilibrium total effort explicitly under a uniform type distribution, we identify the effort-maximizing large Tullock contest. It is shown that the contest designer needs to increase the curvature of the effective effort function, thereby encouraging high-type agents to exert even higher efforts, as the curvature of the effort cost function increases or the support of the type distribution gets narrower. | |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2024-03-11T10:29:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Large-Tullock-contestsJournal-of-Economics-Zeitschrift-fur-Nationalokonomie (1).pdf: 889939 bytes, checksum: 0f3173775e8707c5c21545d830dd8f66 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2023-05-25 | en |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1007/s00712-023-00829-8 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 09318658 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/11693/114496 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.publisher | Springer Nature | |
| dc.relation.isversionof | https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00712-023-00829-8 | |
| dc.rights | CC BY | |
| dc.rights.uri | https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ | |
| dc.source.title | Journal of Economics/ Zeitschrift fur Nationalokonomie | |
| dc.subject | Asymmetric contest | |
| dc.subject | Contest design | |
| dc.subject | Effort-maximizing contests | |
| dc.subject | Large game | |
| dc.subject | Tullock contests | |
| dc.title | Large tullock contests | |
| dc.type | Article |