Complementarities and the existence of Strong Berge equilibrium
dc.citation.epage | 379 | en_US |
dc.citation.issueNumber | 3 | en_US |
dc.citation.spage | 373 | en_US |
dc.citation.volumeNumber | 48 | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Keskin, K. | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Sağlam, Ç. | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2015-07-28T12:01:46Z | |
dc.date.available | 2015-07-28T12:01:46Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | en_US |
dc.department | Department of Economics | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | This paper studies the existence and the order structure of strong Berge equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium, for games with strategic complementarities a la strong Berge. It is shown that the equilibrium set is a nonempty complete lattice. Moreover, we provide a monotone comparative statics result such that the greatest and the lowest equilibria are increasing. | en_US |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1051/ro/2014012 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0399-0559 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11693/12516 | |
dc.language.iso | English | en_US |
dc.publisher | EDP Sciences | en_US |
dc.relation.isversionof | http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/ro/2014012 | en_US |
dc.source.title | RAIRO - Operations Research | en_US |
dc.subject | Strong Berge equilibrium | en_US |
dc.subject | Refinement | en_US |
dc.subject | Games with strategic complementarities | en_US |
dc.subject | Fixed point theory | en_US |
dc.subject | Supermodularity | en_US |
dc.title | Complementarities and the existence of Strong Berge equilibrium | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
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