Complementarities and the existence of Strong Berge equilibrium

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dc.citation.epage379en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber3en_US
dc.citation.spage373en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber48en_US
dc.contributor.authorKeskin, K.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSağlam, Ç.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-28T12:01:46Z
dc.date.available2015-07-28T12:01:46Z
dc.date.issued2014en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper studies the existence and the order structure of strong Berge equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium, for games with strategic complementarities a la strong Berge. It is shown that the equilibrium set is a nonempty complete lattice. Moreover, we provide a monotone comparative statics result such that the greatest and the lowest equilibria are increasing.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1051/ro/2014012en_US
dc.identifier.issn0399-0559
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/12516
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherEDP Sciencesen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1051/ro/2014012en_US
dc.source.titleRAIRO - Operations Researchen_US
dc.subjectStrong Berge equilibriumen_US
dc.subjectRefinementen_US
dc.subjectGames with strategic complementaritiesen_US
dc.subjectFixed point theoryen_US
dc.subjectSupermodularityen_US
dc.titleComplementarities and the existence of Strong Berge equilibriumen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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