Complementarities and the existence of Strong Berge equilibrium

Date

2014

Authors

Keskin, K.
Sağlam, Ç.

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Abstract

This paper studies the existence and the order structure of strong Berge equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium, for games with strategic complementarities a la strong Berge. It is shown that the equilibrium set is a nonempty complete lattice. Moreover, we provide a monotone comparative statics result such that the greatest and the lowest equilibria are increasing.

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RAIRO - Operations Research

Publisher

EDP Sciences

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Published Version (Please cite this version)

Language

English