Complementarities and the existence of Strong Berge equilibrium
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Date
2014
Authors
Keskin, K.
Sağlam, Ç.
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Abstract
This paper studies the existence and the order structure of strong Berge equilibrium, a refinement of Nash equilibrium, for games with strategic complementarities a la strong Berge. It is shown that the equilibrium set is a nonempty complete lattice. Moreover, we provide a monotone comparative statics result such that the greatest and the lowest equilibria are increasing.
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RAIRO - Operations Research
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EDP Sciences
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English