Counting composites
| buir.contributor.author | Payton, Jonathan D. | |
| buir.contributor.orcid | Payton, Jonathan D.|0000-0002-2385-096X | |
| dc.citation.epage | 710 | en_US |
| dc.citation.issueNumber | 4 | en_US |
| dc.citation.spage | 695 | en_US |
| dc.citation.volumeNumber | 100 | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | Payton, Jonathan D. | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2022-02-14T08:51:32Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2022-02-14T08:51:32Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2021-08-21 | |
| dc.department | Department of Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | I defend the thesis that Composition Entails Identity (CEI): that is, a whole is identical to all of its parts, taken together. CEI seems to be inconsistent, since it seems to require that the parts of a whole possess incompatible number properties (for instance, being one thing and being many things). I show that these number properties are, in fact, compatible. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/00048402.2021.1938617 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.eissn | 1471-6828 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0004-8402 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11693/77315 | |
| dc.language.iso | English | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Routledge | en_US |
| dc.relation.isversionof | https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2021.1938617 | en_US |
| dc.source.title | Australasian Journal of Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.subject | Mereology | en_US |
| dc.subject | Composition as identity | en_US |
| dc.subject | Number | en_US |
| dc.subject | Numerical expressions | en_US |
| dc.subject | Plural logic | en_US |
| dc.title | Counting composites | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |