Scholarly Publications - Philosophy

Permanent URI for this collectionhttps://hdl.handle.net/11693/115655

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Editors’ introduction
(2025-10-29) Moran, Alex; Rossi, Carlo
This introduction by the editors introduces the main themes that the volume covers. It discusses the philosophical importance of the volume and summarizes the individual contributions. It also offers the reader a general snapshot of contemporary work on objects and properties in general, and outlines some of the central contemporary debates. The editors begin by setting out some key debates from the contemporary literature regarding objects and properties, so as to give the reader a general sense of the current landscape. They then turn more specifically to the themes covered in the volume and the chapters contained therein, first discussing some central themes and topics that appear across the nine chapters, then providing a detailed overview of each of the main chapters themselves.
Open Access
What can we do? collective ability, and co-agential capacity
(Springer Science and Business Media B.V., 2026-02-01) Wringe, Bill
I address the question of whether non-agential groups can have agential powers, or abilities and propose a new analysis of group agential powers. In this paper I provide a plausible counter-example to the claim that the only groups of agents that can have agential powers are collective agents, and discuss other, weaker conditions which a groups of agents must satisfy in order to have agential powers. In particular, I introduce a notion which I call ‘co-agential attunement’ and provide an analysis of group agential powers on which a group’s members must be capable of becoming co-agentially attuned in order to have agential powers. Some non-agential groups meet this condition: a group’s members having the mere capacity for co-agential attunement does not make the group a collective agent.
Open Access
The method of hypotheses in early modern natural philosophy
(Cambridge University Press, 2026-02-16) Fatollahi, Alireza
Newton famously rejected the use of hypotheses in natural philosophy, in stark contrast to many of his contemporaries, such as Descartes, Huygens, and Leibniz, who employed hypothetical methods. This disagreement is often framed as one concerning the Hypothetico-Deductive (HD) method, but I argue that this is mistaken. The relevant hypothesis-based methods at issue were what I call inference to the best hypothesis and its stronger version, inference to the only plausible hypothesis. These methods were far more nuanced and plausible than HD, and they enjoyed widespread popularity among early modern thinkers, even among prominent experimental philosophers. Newton rejected them nonetheless.
Open Access
Slavery, the French revolution, and Condorcet’s childhood argument
(Routledge, 2026-01-12) Bergès, Sandrine
In a 1781 book on why slavery ought to be abolished, Condorcet argued that the enslaved were not fit to enjoy liberty, because, like children, they were not capable of handling it without harming others or themselves. A version of Condorcet's argument was adopted by the Legislative Assembly in May 1791 to halt the abolition of slavery. I will start by looking at the historical and philosophical context of Condorcet's argument, showing how the argument he used, which was similar to that used by his anti-abolitionist adversaries, belonged in the Aristotelian tradition of defending slavery as natural. I call this the Childhood Argument. I then present in more detail Condorcet's own version of the Childhood Argument and its role in bringing about the conclusion that gradual abolition is appropriate. Finally, I consider objections to Condorcet's Childhood Argument from Olympe de Gouges, Mary Wollstonecraft, and Elizabeth Heyrick. Each of these was formulated in or around the time Condorcet was writing. All of them were formulated by women philosophers. I conclude that the Childhood Argument, which marred Condorcet's abolitionist views, was one that he could have avoided making.
Open Access
Aristotle’s compositional hierarchy in Parts of Animals II 1, 646a12-24
(Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2025-09-24) Krizan, Mary Katrina
In 𝘗𝘢𝘳𝘵𝘴 𝘰𝘧 𝘈𝘯𝘪𝘮𝘢𝘭𝘴 II 1, 646a12-24, Aristotle identiﬁes three compositions, arranged from simple to complex. Although the passage clearly indicates that non-uniform parts are constructed from uniform parts, two ambiguities in the passage call the status of uniform compounds into question. Both ambiguities point toward divergent interpretations of (1) the relationship between uniform parts of living things and their inanimate or inorganic counterparts, and (2) the relationship of uniform compounds to their own material causes. The objective of this paper is to identify and resolve the two ambiguities in 𝘗𝘈 II 1, 646a12-24, with an eye toward the consequences for uniform materials in Aristotle’s natural philosophy. In doing so, this paper argues that for Aristotle, uniform parts of living things, while they are parts of living bodies, are structurally as well as functionally distinct from inorganic and non-functional compounds.
Open Access
Logical fatalism and causal nihilism
(Springer Dordrecht, 2025-08-28) Berkovski, Y. Sandy
I argue, first, that logical fatalism entails an implausible commitment to causal nihilism. Not only is such a commitment grossly implausible, but it also leads to a reductio of the fatalist’s argument. Then I compare my diagnosis with Merricks’ refutation of fatalism based on an account of ontological dependence.
Open Access
Contingent grounding physicalism
(John Wiley and Sons Ltd, 2025-11-03) Moran, Alex
It is widely held that physicalism is incompatible with the metaphysical possibility of zombies, i.e., beings physically just likeus yet lacking in phenomenal consciousness. The present paper argues that this orthodoxy is mistaken. As against the receivedwisdom, physicalism is perfectly compatible with the possibility of zombies and zombie-worlds. Arguments from the possibilityof zombies to the falsity of physicalism do not, therefore, succeed. To establish this, the paper develops a form of physicalism onwhich the phenomenal facts are metaphysically grounded in the basic physical facts in accordance with metaphysically contin-gent grounding laws. It also draws out some important morals for the contemporary mind–body debate.
Open Access
With pleasure: a feminist contractarian supplement to the nonideal theory of consent
(Routledge, 2025-08-17) Demirtaş, Bengü
This article offers a feminist contractarian supplement to Quill R. Kukla’s nonideal theory of consent by focusing on mutual dispositions towards pleasure for the evaluation of the justice of a sexual encounter. Considering Kukla’s advocacy in favour of sexual communication for increased sexual agency under nonideal conditions, the absence of mutual positive dispositions towards pleasure in the scaffolding of consent is a considerable gap. The supplement I am proposing favours an equitable distribution of sexual costs and benefits and ensures positive expressions of agency that go beyond safety, trust, and epistemic capability. First, I argue that collaborative accounts of sexual agency must acknowledge the differences in the breadth of space allowed for women’s and nonbinary people’s pleasure versus men’s in the broader social context where sexual communication occurs. Then, adapting Jean Hampton’s feminist contractarianism to the sexual domain, I offer a supplement to Kukla’s scaffolding. I further argue that each partner’s positive dispositions towards their own and their partner’s pleasure help promote the expression of the positive agential powers of oppressed groups in sexual settings. Lastly, I respond to objections from cases of asexuality and sex work.
Open Access
A ‘drainage hole’ in being: Sartre and first-person realism
(Cambridge University Press, 2025-05-05) Kinkaid, James
Both classical phenomenology and contemporary first-person realism accord a special metaphysical status to perspectives. Yet ‘inegalitarian’ forms of first-person realism are, I argue, vulnerable to Sartre’s response to the problem of other minds in Being and Nothingness. After discussing the special status Sartre accords to the first-person perspective (‘ipseity’) and signaling its affinities with first-person realism, I argue that Sartre’s description of encountering the other undermines Giovanni Merlo’s argument for metaphysical solipsism. I then show how a metaphysical notion of standpoint borrowed from the first-person realist literature irons out a wrinkle in Sartre’s transcendental argument regarding other minds. I close by suggesting a kinship between Sartre’s notion of a ‘detotalized totality’ and the ‘fragmentalist’ idea embraced by some first-person realists that reality does not form a coherent whole.
Open Access
Is Sartre an eleatic monist?
(Cambridge University Press, 2025-07-22) Kinkaid, James
It has long been recognized that Sartre's description of "being-in-itself" in the Introduction to Being and Nothingness (B&N) is reminiscent of Eleatic monism, the view traditionally attributed to Parmenides on which there is only one mind-independent entity, which is undifferentiated and atemporal. I reconstruct two arguments from premises Sartre endorses in B&N for Eleatic monism. These arguments are interesting not only because they give new life to an old reading of B&N, but also because there has recently been a revival of interest in monism in analytic metaphysics.
Open Access
Heidegger and the concept horse
(Routledge, 2025-11-05) Kinkaid, James
Open Access
Pluralism, alternate composition cases, and conditional grounding
(Oxford University Press, 2025-10-29) Moran, Alexander Paul
This chapter discusses a challenge to the pluralist thesis that complex objects depend for their properties on the properties and interrelations of their basic proper parts. The chapter argues that to resolve the challenge, pluralists should reject the widely held idea that grounds necessitate, holding instead that grounding relations can hold conditionally (and hence contingently), and more specifically that (certain of the) intrinsic properties of composite objects are only conditionally grounded in the properties and relations of their proper parts, whereby the conditions involve extrinsic factors. Notably, this proposal has the surprising consequence that (at least some) genuinely intrinsic properties can have extrinsic conditions on their instantiation.
Open Access
Collective nouns and the distribution problem
(Springer, 2025-03-28) Nicolas, David; Payton, Jonathan D.
Intuitively, collective nouns are pseudo-singular: a collection of things (a pair of people, a flock of birds, etc.) just is the things that make ‘it’ up. But certain facts about natural language seem to count against this view. In short, distributive predicates and numerals interact with collective nouns in ways that they seemingly shouldn’t if those nouns are pseudo-singular. We call this set of issues ‘the distribution problem’. To solve it, we propose a modification to cover-based semantics. On this semantics, the interpretation of distributive predicates and numerals depends on a cover, where the choice of cover is strongly semantically constrained by the noun with which they interact.
Open Access
In defense of Bayesian Information Criterion
(Springer, 2025-07-11) Fatollahi, Alireza; Alishahi, Kasra
This essay critically examines well-known arguments against Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). These arguments claim that I) BIC violates axioms of probability calculus in the case of nested families of statistical hypotheses (‘models’). II) BIC cannot explain why scientists sometimes prefer models with fewer adjustable parameters. And III) BIC’s verdict on a model is sensitive to arbitrary choices of priors over members of models or their parameterization. We argue that although these criticisms contain valuable cautionary advice against the improper use of BIC, they have no force against its general and proper use.
Open Access
Objects and properties: new perspectives
(Oxford University Press, 2025-10-29) Moran, Alex; Rossi, Carlo
This edited volume features a range of chapters from world-leading philosophers discussing the key philosophical concepts of ‘object’ and ‘property’. The chapters in the volume showcase some of the best and most state-of-the-art research concerning these crucial concepts, while also bringing into view a ‘snapshot’ of current cutting-edge work in the area, across a broad range of philosophically central sub-topics. The reader will find in-depth discussions of connected debates ranging from grounding and metaphysical explanation to reduction, truthmaking, pluralism versus monism about material objects, intrinsic versus extrinsic properties, the philosophy of colour, the mind–body problem, processual views of material objects, change, modality, persistence, and composition, to name only a few of the main areas covered herein.
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From singular to plural.. and beyond?
(Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc., 2025-05) Payton, Jonathan D.
A growing number of philosophers and logicians advocate for plural languages in which we can refer to and quantify over pluralities of individuals. Some go further, advocating for higher-level languages in which we can refer to and quantify over, not just pluralities of individuals, but pluralities of pluralities, pluralities of pluralities of pluralities, and so on. These languages suggest a metaphysical picture on which even a small pool of individuals gives rise to a potentially infinite hierarchy of distinct pluralities. Most higher-levellists would be loathe to take that picture seriously, but avoiding it turns out to be more difficult than it appears. Fortunately, we can develop a ‘one-level’ plural language which has all the benefits of higher-level ones but which avoids any commitment to the hierarchy.
Open Access
Divided agency, manipulation, and regret
(Universitaet Wien * Institut fuer Philosophie, 2024-11-30) Payton, Jonathan D.
Saba Bazargan-Forward (2022, Authority, Cooperation, and Accountability), conceives of agency as divided into two functions: a deliberative function (deciding what to do) and an executive function (acting on that decision). He claims that these two functions can distributed across multiple agents, and that this has important moral consequences: if you outsource the executive function to me, then the practical reasons you take there to be, for A-ing, are relevant to whether I can permissibly A and to how my A-ing reflects on my character. However, the natural way of understanding the 'divided agency' model --- i.e. that in cases of divided agency the executor literally acts on the deliberator's reasons --- is problematic and doesn't seem to reflect Bazargan-Forward's considered view, while his considered view doesn't seem to support his moral judgments, either about the permissibility of the executor's behaviour or of their character. I suggest an alternative to Bazargan-Forward's 'divided agency' model and consider what moral judgments it supports.
Open Access
The synthetic unity of reason and nature in the third critique
(Routledge, 2024-01-02) Vatansever, Saniye
In this paper, I advance a new interpretation of the argumentative structure of the third Critique, which in turn clarifies the connection between its two apparently unrelated parts. I propose to read the third Critique as a response to Kant's question of hope, which concerns the satisfaction of reason's practical and theoretical interests. On this proposal, while the first part on aesthetics describes what we-as possessors of theoretical reason - may hope for, the second part, on teleology, describes what we - as possessors of practical reason - may hope for. The main question of the third Critique is, 'What may we hope if we act as we should, i.e. act rationally?' Kant's implicit answer is, 'to attain the ideals of reason, which leads to happiness as a consequence of it.' This novel reconstruction of the argumentative structure of the third Critique contributes to the literature by (i) explaining how the two parts of the third Critique on aesthetics and teleology are connected, (ii) clarifying how the ideals of reason are connected to hope and happiness, and (iii) showing how the spheres of nature and freedom can be synthetically unified through the faculty of judgment.
Open Access
Introduction
(Springer Dordrecht, 2024-11-27) Hormio, Säde; Wringe, Bill; Hormio, Säde; Wringe, Bill
Collective action and responsibility have gained increased attention in the past decades. The influence of collective agents on our lives and the prevalence of collective harms, such as climate change, has brought the collective nature of human action into the spotlight. Philosophers have addressed these issues from the viewpoint of social ontology and political philosophy. Despite their complementary focus on the nature of collective action and agency on the one hand and the nature of political action on the other, the two strands of philosophical literature have seen relatively little cross-pollination so far. This volume aims to bring these two strands a little closer to one another, aiming to expand the range of issues within political philosophy to which conceptual resources for understanding collective responsibility developed within the field of social ontology can be applied. At the same time, we aim to also shed new light on issues that have been staples of discussion within the social ontology literature, including the extent to which collective agents can be understood as moral agents and, hence, as bearers of a kind of collective moral responsibility. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2024.
Open Access
Husserl and the marks of the mental
(Springer, 2024-12-20) Kinkaid, James
An active area of research in the philosophy of mind concerns the relation between the two marks of the mental: intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. One position that has recently gained in popularity is the phenomenal intentionality theory, according to which intentionality arises from phenomenal consciousness. Proponents of the phenomenal intentionality theory recognize Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology as a precedent, but little work has been done to locate Husserl within the contemporary landscape of views on the relation between the marks of the mental. My aim is to do just that. I start by arguing that Husserl qualifies as an inseparatist: he holds that original intentionality and phenomenal consciousness necessarily co-vary. I then give a Husserlian critique of a notable and radical version of the phenomenal intentionality theory defended by Angela Mendelovici, focusing on her accounts of color perception and thought. Finally, I sketch a Husserlian version of the phenomenal intentionality theory that I think ought to be a serious contender in the contemporary scene.