Endogenous reference points in bargaining

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buir.contributor.authorKaragözoğlu, Emin
dc.citation.epage295en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber2en_US
dc.citation.spage283en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber88en_US
dc.contributor.authorKaragözoğlu, Eminen_US
dc.contributor.authorKeskin, K.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-02-21T16:05:24Z
dc.date.available2019-02-21T16:05:24Z
dc.date.issued2018en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractWe allow the reference point in (cooperative) bargaining problems with a reference point to be endogenously determined. Two loss averse agents simultaneously and strategically choose their reference points, taking into consideration that with a certain probability they will not be able to reach an agreement and will receive their disagreement point outcomes, whereas with the remaining probability an arbitrator will distribute the resource by using (an extended) Gupta-Livne bargaining solution (Gupta and Livne in Manag Sci 34:1303-1314, 1988). The model delivers intuitive equilibrium comparative statics on the breakdown probability, the loss aversion coefficients, and the disagreement point outcomes.
dc.description.sponsorshipAcknowledgements We would like to thank two anonymous reviewers and an associate editor for their constructive comments, which improved the paper. Emin Karagözog˘ lu acknowledges financial support from Bilim Akademisi (The Science Academy, Turkey).
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s00186-018-0636-2
dc.identifier.eissn1432-5217en_US
dc.identifier.issn1432-2994
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/50250
dc.language.isoEnglish
dc.publisherSpringer Verlag
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s00186-018-0636-2
dc.relation.projectBilim Akademisi
dc.source.titleMathematical Methods of Operations Researchen_US
dc.subjectBargaining problemen_US
dc.subjectGupta-Livne solutionen_US
dc.subjectLoss aversionen_US
dc.subjectProspect theoryen_US
dc.subjectReference pointsen_US
dc.titleEndogenous reference points in bargainingen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US
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