Endogenous reference points in bargaining

Date

2018

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Abstract

We allow the reference point in (cooperative) bargaining problems with a reference point to be endogenously determined. Two loss averse agents simultaneously and strategically choose their reference points, taking into consideration that with a certain probability they will not be able to reach an agreement and will receive their disagreement point outcomes, whereas with the remaining probability an arbitrator will distribute the resource by using (an extended) Gupta-Livne bargaining solution (Gupta and Livne in Manag Sci 34:1303-1314, 1988). The model delivers intuitive equilibrium comparative statics on the breakdown probability, the loss aversion coefficients, and the disagreement point outcomes.

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Mathematical Methods of Operations Research

Publisher

Springer Verlag

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Published Version (Please cite this version)

Language

English