Bribing in team contests

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buir.contributor.authorDoğan, Serhat
buir.contributor.authorKaragözoğlu, Emin
buir.contributor.authorSağlam, Çağrı
buir.contributor.orcidKaragözoğlu, Emin|0000-0003-2442-6949
dc.citation.epage9en_US
dc.citation.spage1en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber113en_US
dc.contributor.authorDoğan, Serhat
dc.contributor.authorKaragözoğlu, Emin
dc.contributor.authorKeskin, K.
dc.contributor.authorSağlam, Çağrı
dc.date.accessioned2022-02-23T08:03:07Z
dc.date.available2022-02-23T08:03:07Z
dc.date.issued2021-04-21
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractWe study bribing in a sequential team contest with multiple pairwise battles. Allowing for asymmetries in winning prizes and marginal costs of effort, we present the conditions under which (i) a player in a team is offered a bribe by the owner of the other team and (ii) she accepts that bribe. We show that these conditions depend on the ratios of players’ winning prizes and marginal costs of effort: the team owner chooses to bribe the player with the most favorable winning prize to marginal cost of effort ratio, and offers a bribe that leaves her indifferent between accepting (and exerting zero effort) and rejecting (and exerting her optimal effort). In some cases, the competition between players and the negative consequences of one player receiving a bribe on the team performance can drag down the equilibrium bribe to zero. We also study the impact of changes in winning prizes and marginal costs of effort on the equilibrium bribing behavior.en_US
dc.embargo.release2023-04-21
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.04.008en_US
dc.identifier.issn0165-4896
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/77561
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherElsevieren_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.04.008en_US
dc.source.titleMathematical Social Sciencesen_US
dc.subjectBribingen_US
dc.subjectContest gamesen_US
dc.subjectPairwise battlesen_US
dc.subjectSide paymentsen_US
dc.subjectTeam contestsen_US
dc.titleBribing in team contestsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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