How expressivists can and should explain inconsistency
| dc.citation.epage | 424 | en_US |
| dc.citation.issueNumber | 2 | en_US |
| dc.citation.spage | 391 | en_US |
| dc.citation.volumeNumber | 125 | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | Baker, D. | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | Woods, J. | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-07-28T12:01:48Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2015-07-28T12:01:48Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015 | en_US |
| dc.department | Department of Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | We argue that several difficulties facing expressivist solutions to the Frege-Geach problem are paralleled by almost exactly analogous problems facing realist semantic theories. We show that by adopting a variation on a prominent realist solution, the expressivist brings her account of logical consequence closer to philosophical orthodoxy. Our discussion also demonstrates that a standard objection to expressivism is based on a misinterpretation of the Frege-Geach problem and that the expressivist can appeal to a wide range of attitudinal conflicts in her semantic theorizingfar wider than Mark Schroeder, for example, allows in his recent work. | en_US |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2015-07-28T12:01:48Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 7987.pdf: 351084 bytes, checksum: 832ab29db85512be9b1b604d239529ff (MD5) | en |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1086/678371 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0014-1704 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11693/12526 | |
| dc.language.iso | English | en_US |
| dc.publisher | University of Chicago Press | en_US |
| dc.relation.isversionof | http://dx.doi.org/10.1086/678371 | en_US |
| dc.source.title | Ethics | en_US |
| dc.subject | Irrationality | en_US |
| dc.subject | Paradox | en_US |
| dc.title | How expressivists can and should explain inconsistency | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
Files
Original bundle
1 - 1 of 1