How expressivists can and should explain inconsistency
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Date
2015
Authors
Baker, D.
Woods, J.
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Source Title
Ethics
Print ISSN
0014-1704
Electronic ISSN
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Volume
125
Issue
2
Pages
391 - 424
Language
English
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Journal Title
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Abstract
We argue that several difficulties facing expressivist solutions to the Frege-Geach problem are paralleled by almost exactly analogous problems facing realist semantic theories. We show that by adopting a variation on a prominent realist solution, the expressivist brings her account of logical consequence closer to philosophical orthodoxy. Our discussion also demonstrates that a standard objection to expressivism is based on a misinterpretation of the Frege-Geach problem and that the expressivist can appeal to a wide range of attitudinal conflicts in her semantic theorizingfar wider than Mark Schroeder, for example, allows in his recent work.