When do imposed sanctions work? The role of target regime type

buir.contributor.authorZarpli, Omer
buir.contributor.orcidZarpli, Omer|0000-0002-2783-8255
dc.citation.epage28en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber0en_US
dc.citation.spage1en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber0en_US
dc.contributor.authorZarpli, Omer
dc.date.accessioned2023-02-15T07:11:39Z
dc.date.available2023-02-15T07:11:39Z
dc.date.issued2022
dc.departmentDepartment of International Relationsen_US
dc.description.abstractA number of studies on sanction effectiveness have highlighted the importance of regime type and how it affects the sensitivity of sanctioned states (target) to the economic costs of sanctions. The scholarly consensus holds that mainly because of their responsiveness to domestic audiences, democratic regimes are most likely to give in to the demands of the sanctioning state (sender). I argue that regime type is important not only in influencing leaders’ sensitivity to economic costs—which create incentives to back down—but also to the audience costs—which create incentives to stand firm. I argue that taking the audience cost into account would lead to different predictions about the effect of democracy. Particularly, I argue that the effect of democracy is inverted- U shaped, where full democracies have no higher likelihood of meeting the demands of the sender than mixed (hybrid) regimes. Using a newly released dataset on economic sanctions between 1950-2020, I find robust support for my argument.en_US
dc.description.provenanceSubmitted by Mandana Moftakhari (mandana.mir@bilkent.edu.tr) on 2023-02-15T07:11:39Z No. of bitstreams: 1 When_do_imposed_sanctions_work_the_role_of_target_regime_type.pdf: 640675 bytes, checksum: 6fade2ba374cef10b68dad63301cabf8 (MD5)en
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2023-02-15T07:11:39Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 When_do_imposed_sanctions_work_the_role_of_target_regime_type.pdf: 640675 bytes, checksum: 6fade2ba374cef10b68dad63301cabf8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2022en
dc.identifier.doi10.1177/00220027221139809en_US
dc.identifier.eissn1552-8766
dc.identifier.issn0022-0027
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/111295
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherSAGEen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1177/00220027221139809en_US
dc.source.titleJournal of Conflict Resolutionen_US
dc.titleWhen do imposed sanctions work? The role of target regime typeen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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