A minimally altruistic refinement of Nash equilibrium
dc.citation.epage | 430 | en_US |
dc.citation.issueNumber | 3 | en_US |
dc.citation.spage | 422 | en_US |
dc.citation.volumeNumber | 66 | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Karagözoǧlu, E. | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Keskin, K. | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Saǧlam, Ç. | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-02-08T09:34:18Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-02-08T09:34:18Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2013 | en_US |
dc.department | Department of Economics | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | We introduce a minimal notion of altruism and use it to refine Nash equilibria in normal form games. We provide three independent existence proofs, relate minimally altruistic Nash equilibrium to other equilibrium concepts, conduct an in-depth sensitivity analysis, and provide examples where minimally altruistic Nash equilibrium leads to improved predictions. | en_US |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2016-02-08T09:34:18Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 bilkent-research-paper.pdf: 70227 bytes, checksum: 26e812c6f5156f83f0e77b261a471b5a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 | en |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.10.003 | en_US |
dc.identifier.issn | 0165-4896 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11693/20742 | |
dc.language.iso | English | en_US |
dc.publisher | Elsevier | en_US |
dc.relation.isversionof | http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2013.10.003 | en_US |
dc.source.title | Mathematical Social Sciences | en_US |
dc.title | A minimally altruistic refinement of Nash equilibrium | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
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