A minimally altruistic refinement of Nash equilibrium

Date

2013

Authors

Karagözoǧlu, E.
Keskin, K.
Saǧlam, Ç.

Editor(s)

Advisor

Supervisor

Co-Advisor

Co-Supervisor

Instructor

BUIR Usage Stats
3
views
28
downloads

Citation Stats

Series

Abstract

We introduce a minimal notion of altruism and use it to refine Nash equilibria in normal form games. We provide three independent existence proofs, relate minimally altruistic Nash equilibrium to other equilibrium concepts, conduct an in-depth sensitivity analysis, and provide examples where minimally altruistic Nash equilibrium leads to improved predictions.

Source Title

Mathematical Social Sciences

Publisher

Elsevier

Course

Other identifiers

Book Title

Keywords

Degree Discipline

Degree Level

Degree Name

Citation

Published Version (Please cite this version)

Language

English