Husserl and the marks of the mental

Abstract

An active area of research in the philosophy of mind concerns the relation between the two marks of the mental: intentionality and phenomenal consciousness. One position that has recently gained in popularity is the phenomenal intentionality theory, according to which intentionality arises from phenomenal consciousness. Proponents of the phenomenal intentionality theory recognize Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology as a precedent, but little work has been done to locate Husserl within the contemporary landscape of views on the relation between the marks of the mental. My aim is to do just that. I start by arguing that Husserl qualifies as an inseparatist: he holds that original intentionality and phenomenal consciousness necessarily co-vary. I then give a Husserlian critique of a notable and radical version of the phenomenal intentionality theory defended by Angela Mendelovici, focusing on her accounts of color perception and thought. Finally, I sketch a Husserlian version of the phenomenal intentionality theory that I think ought to be a serious contender in the contemporary scene.