A tale of two bargaining solutions

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dc.citation.epage174en_US
dc.citation.spage161en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber6en_US
dc.contributor.authorKaragözoğlu, E.en_US
dc.contributor.authorKeskin, K.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2019-01-23T11:03:39Z
dc.date.available2019-01-23T11:03:39Z
dc.date.issued2015-06-19en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractWe set up a rich bilateral bargaining model with four salient points (disagreement point, ideal point, reference point, and tempered aspirations point), where the disagreement point and the utility possibilities frontier are endogenously determined. This model allows us to compare two bargaining solutions that use reference points, the Gupta-Livne solution and the tempered aspirations solution, in terms of Pareto efficiency in a strategic framework. Our main result shows that the weights solutions place on the disagreement point do not directly imply a unique efficiency ranking in this bargaining problem with a reference point. In particular, the introduction of a reference point brings one more degree of freedom to the model which requires also the difference in the weights placed on the reference point to be considered in reaching an efficiency ranking.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.3390/g6020161en_US
dc.identifier.issn2073-4336
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/48262
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherM D P I AGen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.3390/g6020161en_US
dc.source.titleGamesen_US
dc.subjectBargaining problemen_US
dc.subjectEndogenous disagreement pointsen_US
dc.subjectReference pointsen_US
dc.subjectAspiration pointsen_US
dc.titleA tale of two bargaining solutionsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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