Self-selective social choice functions verify arrow and gibbard-satterthwaite theorems

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dc.citation.epage995en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber4en_US
dc.citation.spage981en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber68en_US
dc.contributor.authorKoray, S.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T10:36:54Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T10:36:54Z
dc.date.issued2000en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper introduces a new notion of consistency for social choice functions, called self-selectivity, which requires that a social choice function employed by a society to make a choice from a given alternative set it faces should choose itself from among other rival such functions when it is employed by the society to make this latter choice as well. A unanimous neutral social choice function turns out to be universally self-selective if and only if it is Paretian and satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives. The neutral unanimous social choice functions whose domains consist of linear order profiles on nonempty sets of any finite cardinality induce a class of social welfare functions that inherit Paretianism and independence of irrelevant alternatives in case the social choice function with which one starts is universally self-selective. Thus, a unanimous and neutral social choice function is universally self-selective if and only if it is dictatorial. Moreover, universal self-selectivity for such functions is equivalent to the conjunction of strategy-proofness and independence of irrelevant alternatives or the conjunction of monotonicity and independence of irrelevant alternatives again.en_US
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2016-02-08T10:36:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 bilkent-research-paper.pdf: 70227 bytes, checksum: 26e812c6f5156f83f0e77b261a471b5a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2000en
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/1468-0262.00143en_US
dc.identifier.eissn1468-0262
dc.identifier.issn0012-9682
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/24963
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherWiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.en_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0262.00143en_US
dc.source.titleEconometricaen_US
dc.subjectDictatorshipen_US
dc.subjectIndependence of irrelevant alternativesen_US
dc.subjectMonotonicityen_US
dc.subjectSelf-selectivityen_US
dc.subjectStrategy-proofnessen_US
dc.titleSelf-selective social choice functions verify arrow and gibbard-satterthwaite theoremsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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