Is optimal monetary policy always optimal?
dc.citation.epage | 384 | en_US |
dc.citation.spage | 353 | en_US |
dc.citation.volumeNumber | 11 | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Daviga, T. | en_US |
dc.contributor.author | Gürkaynak, R. S. | en_US |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-02-08T10:18:33Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-02-08T10:18:33Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | en_US |
dc.department | Department of Economics | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | No. And not only for the reason you think. In a world with multiple ine - ciencies the single policy tool the central bank has control over will not undo all ine ciencies; this is well understood. We argue that the world is better characterized by multiple ine ciencies and multiple policy makers with various objectives. Asking the policy question only in terms of optimal monetary policy e ectively turns the central bank into the residual claimant of all policy and gives the other policymakers a free hand in pursuing their own goals. This further worsens the tradeo s faced by the central bank. The optimal monetary policy literature and the optimal simple rules often labeled exible in ation targeting assign all of the cyclical policymaking duties to central banks. This distorts the policy discussion and narrows the policy choices to a suboptimal set. We highlight this issue and call for a broader thinking of optimal policies. | en_US |
dc.identifier.eissn | 1815-7556 | |
dc.identifier.issn | 1815-4654 | |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11693/23747 | |
dc.language.iso | English | en_US |
dc.publisher | Federal Reserve Board | en_US |
dc.source.title | International Journal of Central Banking | en_US |
dc.title | Is optimal monetary policy always optimal? | en_US |
dc.type | Article | en_US |
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