An Application of Expected Utility Modeling and Game Theory in IR: Assessment of International Bargaining on Iran’s Nuclear Program

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buir.contributor.authorÖzdamar, Özgür
dc.citation.epage230en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber2en_US
dc.citation.spage205en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber8en_US
dc.contributor.authorÖzdamar, Özgür
dc.date.accessioned2020-10-22T10:33:58Z
dc.date.available2020-10-22T10:33:58Z
dc.date.issued2019
dc.departmentDepartment of International Relationsen_US
dc.description.abstractThis article provides an introduction to the theoretical underpinnings of expected utility and game theory approaches in IR studies. It goes on to explore their application to a specific research subject, international bargaining on Iran’s nuclear program. In this application, the article presents forecasts about Iran’s nuclear program using a game theoretic, bounded rationality model called the expected utility model (Bueno de Mesquita 2002). Three analyses were made in December 2005, September 2006 and March 2007. All three forecasts appear to be in line with real-life developments regarding the issue. The results show that Iran has been losing international support since the analyses started, and the last forecast suggests a pro-US position supported by all major international actors. Also, all three analyses suggest that Russian and Chinese support is vital to curb the Iranian nuclear program.en_US
dc.description.provenanceSubmitted by Evrim Ergin (eergin@bilkent.edu.tr) on 2020-10-22T10:33:58Z No. of bitstreams: 1 An_Application_of_expected_utility_modeling_and_game_theory_in_IR_Assessment_of_International_Bargaining_on_Iran’s_Nuclear_program.pdf: 1304606 bytes, checksum: a3e07e8a3c0ceb7c08b004eaf23e509c (MD5)en
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2020-10-22T10:33:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 An_Application_of_expected_utility_modeling_and_game_theory_in_IR_Assessment_of_International_Bargaining_on_Iran’s_Nuclear_program.pdf: 1304606 bytes, checksum: a3e07e8a3c0ceb7c08b004eaf23e509c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019en
dc.identifier.doi10.20991/allazimuth.476858
dc.identifier.issn2146-7757
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/54294
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherDış Politika ve Barış Araştırmaları Merkezi, İhsan Doğramacı Barış Vakfıen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.20991/allazimuth.476858
dc.source.titleAll Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peaceen_US
dc.subjectExpected utility theoryen_US
dc.subjectGame theoryen_US
dc.subjectDynamic median voter model with coercionen_US
dc.subjectForecastingen_US
dc.subjectIranen_US
dc.subjectNuclear programen_US
dc.subjectthe Middle Easten_US
dc.titleAn Application of Expected Utility Modeling and Game Theory in IR: Assessment of International Bargaining on Iran’s Nuclear Programen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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