Median rule and majoritarian compromise

In this thesis, we analyze the relationship between Majoritarian Compromise (Sertel & Yılmaz, 1984) and the Median Rule (Basset & Persky, 1999). We show that, for the populations with odd size, these two rules are equivalent and we describe the relationship for the case where population size is even. Then, we explore some axiomatic properties of Median Rule. It turns out that Median Rule satisfies all properties that Majoritarian Compromise satisfies in Sertel and Yılmaz (1999) and it fails all properties that Majoritarian Compromise fails in Sertel and Yılmaz (1999). We, then, introduce two axioms which differentiate these rules. We conclude that, the Median Rule can be considered as a viable alternative to Majoritarian Compromise, as it satis- fies all axioms that Majoritarian Compromise is known to satisfy except one particular axiom.