A territorial conflict: trade-offs and strategies

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buir.contributor.authorSağlam, Çağrı
dc.citation.epage10en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber6en_US
dc.citation.spage1en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber29en_US
dc.contributor.authorKeskin, K.en_US
dc.contributor.authorSağlam, Çağrıen_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-12T10:40:36Z
dc.date.available2018-04-12T10:40:36Zen_US
dc.date.issued2018en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractWe study a war scenario in which the winner occupies the loser’s territory. Attacking a territory increases the chance of winning, but also causes harm, which in turn decreases the territory’s value (i.e. the reward of winning). This paper highlights the effects of this trade-off on the equilibrium strategies of the warring states in a contest game with endogenous rewards. Providing both static and dynamic models, our analysis captures insights regarding strategic behavior in asymmetric contests with such conflict. © 2017 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Groupen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/10242694.2017.1327297en_US
dc.identifier.eissn1476-8267
dc.identifier.issn1024-2694
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/36463en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherRoutledgeen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2017.1327297en_US
dc.source.titleDefence and Peace Economicsen_US
dc.subjectContesten_US
dc.subjectEndogenous rewarden_US
dc.subjectTerritorial conflicten_US
dc.subjectWaren_US
dc.titleA territorial conflict: trade-offs and strategiesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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