Ambivalence for cognitivists: a lesson from chrysippus?

Date
2017
Authors
Wringe, B.
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Source Title
Thought
Print ISSN
2161-2234
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Publisher
John Wiley and Sons Ltd
Volume
6
Issue
3
Pages
147 - 156
Language
English
Type
Article
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Abstract

Ambivalence—where we experience two conflicting emotional responses to the same object, person or state of affairs—is sometimes thought to pose a problem for cognitive theories of emotion. Drawing on the ideas of the Stoic Chrysippus, I argue that a cognitivist can account for ambivalence without retreating from the view that emotions involve fully-fledged evaluative judgments. It is central to the account I offer that emotions involve two kinds of judgment: one about the object of emotion, and one about the subject's response.

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Keywords
Ambivalence, Cognitivism, Emotion, Neo-stoicism, Phenomenology
Citation
Published Version (Please cite this version)