The evolution of cooperation in finite populations with synergistic payoffs

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buir.contributor.authorVentura, Rafael
dc.citation.epage43-1en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber4en_US
dc.citation.spage43-13en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber34en_US
dc.contributor.authorVentura, Rafaelen_US
dc.date.accessioned2020-01-31T12:44:17Zen_US
dc.date.available2020-01-31T12:44:17Zen_US
dc.date.issued2019en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.description.abstractIn a series of papers, Forber and Smead (J Philos 111(3):151–166, 2014, Biol Philos 30(3):405–421, 2015) and Smead and Forber (Evolution 67(3):698–707, 2013) make a valuable contribution to the study of cooperation in finite populations by analyzing an understudied model: the prisoner’s delight. It always pays to cooperate in the one-shot prisoner’s delight, so this model presents a best-case scenario for the evolution of cooperation. Yet, what Forber and Smead find is highly counterintuitive. In finite populations playing the prisoner’s delight, increasing the benefit of cooperation causes selection to favor defection. Here, I extend their model by considering the effects of non-linear payoffs. In particular, I show that interesting subtleties arise when payoffs are synergistic. Indeed, analysis reveals that increasing the benefit of cooperation does not always favor the spread of defection if payoffs are synergistic. I conclude by drawing some general considerations about robustness analysis in evolutionary models.en_US
dc.description.provenanceSubmitted by Zeynep Aykut (zeynepay@bilkent.edu.tr) on 2020-01-31T12:44:17Z No. of bitstreams: 2 The_evolution_of_cooperation_in_finite_populations_with_synergistic_payoffs.pdf: 697276 bytes, checksum: c266de2ef27f8e33ce8533a4bb5ed400 (MD5) The_evolution_of_cooperation_in_finite_populations_with_synergistic_payoffs.pdf: 697276 bytes, checksum: c266de2ef27f8e33ce8533a4bb5ed400 (MD5)en
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2020-01-31T12:44:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 The_evolution_of_cooperation_in_finite_populations_with_synergistic_payoffs.pdf: 697276 bytes, checksum: c266de2ef27f8e33ce8533a4bb5ed400 (MD5) The_evolution_of_cooperation_in_finite_populations_with_synergistic_payoffs.pdf: 697276 bytes, checksum: c266de2ef27f8e33ce8533a4bb5ed400 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019en
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s10539-019-9695-xen_US
dc.identifier.issn0169-3867en_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/52952en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10539-019-9695-xen_US
dc.source.titleBiology and Philosophyen_US
dc.subjectCooperationen_US
dc.subjectPrisoner’s delighten_US
dc.subjectFinite populationsen_US
dc.subjectSynergyen_US
dc.titleThe evolution of cooperation in finite populations with synergistic payoffsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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