A note on efficient signaling of bargaining power

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dc.citation.epage126en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber1en_US
dc.citation.spage119en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber29en_US
dc.contributor.authorBac, M.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T10:38:50Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T10:38:50Z
dc.date.issued2000en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractStrategic delay and restricted offers are two modes of signaling bargaining power in alternating offers bargaining games. This paper shows that when both modes are available, the best signaling strategy of the "strong" type of the informed player consists of a pure strategic delay followed by an offer on the whole pie. There is no signaling motivation for issue-by-issue bargaining when the issues are perfectly substitutable.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s001829900024en_US
dc.identifier.eissn1432-1270
dc.identifier.issn0020-7276
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/25082
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s001829900024en_US
dc.source.titleInternational Journal of Game Theoryen_US
dc.subjectAlternating offers bargainingen_US
dc.subjectDelayen_US
dc.subjectIncomplete informationen_US
dc.subjectSequential equilibriumen_US
dc.titleA note on efficient signaling of bargaining poweren_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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