Delegation in a duopolistic differentiated goods market with Bertrand competition

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buir.advisorKoray, Semih
dc.contributor.authorYıldırım, Hüseyin
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-08T20:12:22Z
dc.date.available2016-01-08T20:12:22Z
dc.date.issued1995
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.descriptionAnkara : Department of Economics and the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences of Bilkent University, 1995.en_US
dc.descriptionThesis (Master's) -- Bilkent University, 1995.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references leaves leaf 22en_US
dc.description.abstractThe impact of delegation in a firm has been observed by many modern authors. Vickers(1985), Fershtman and Judd(1987), Sklivas(1987) considered the problem as part of positive economic theory whereas Koray and Sertel(1989) treated it as a regulation problem. We examine a similar problem for a duopolistic dilTerentiated good market with Bertrand competition and lengthen the delegation chain to 5 managers. Our findings show that the firms’ profits are monotonically increasing, i.e. there is a positive incentive to redelegate for each firm. Our natural conjecture is that, in the limit, firms reach collusion non-cooperatively.en_US
dc.description.degreeM.A.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityYıldırım, Hüseyinen_US
dc.format.extentvi, [31] leavesen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/17669
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherBilkent Universityen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectDelegationen_US
dc.subjectRegulationen_US
dc.subjectNon-cooperative gamesen_US
dc.subjectBertrand competitionen_US
dc.subjectCournot competitionen_US
dc.subjectProduct diiferentiationen_US
dc.subjectPrincipalen_US
dc.subjectAgent gamesen_US
dc.subjectEfficiencyen_US
dc.subject.lccHD50 .Y55 1995en_US
dc.subject.lcshDelegation of authority.en_US
dc.subject.lcshOligopolies.en_US
dc.subject.lcshCompetition.en_US
dc.subject.lcshCooperation.en_US
dc.subject.lcshIndustrial management.en_US
dc.subject.lcshIndustrial efficiency.en_US
dc.titleDelegation in a duopolistic differentiated goods market with Bertrand competitionen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US

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