Delegation in a duopolistic differentiated goods market with Bertrand competition
buir.advisor | Koray, Semih | |
dc.contributor.author | Yıldırım, Hüseyin | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-01-08T20:12:22Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-01-08T20:12:22Z | |
dc.date.issued | 1995 | |
dc.description | Ankara : Department of Economics and the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences of Bilkent University, 1995. | en_US |
dc.description | Thesis (Master's) -- Bilkent University, 1995. | en_US |
dc.description | Includes bibliographical references leaves leaf 22 | en_US |
dc.description.abstract | The impact of delegation in a firm has been observed by many modern authors. Vickers(1985), Fershtman and Judd(1987), Sklivas(1987) considered the problem as part of positive economic theory whereas Koray and Sertel(1989) treated it as a regulation problem. We examine a similar problem for a duopolistic dilTerentiated good market with Bertrand competition and lengthen the delegation chain to 5 managers. Our findings show that the firms’ profits are monotonically increasing, i.e. there is a positive incentive to redelegate for each firm. Our natural conjecture is that, in the limit, firms reach collusion non-cooperatively. | en_US |
dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2016-01-08T20:12:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 1.pdf: 78510 bytes, checksum: d85492f20c2362aa2bcf4aad49380397 (MD5) | en |
dc.description.statementofresponsibility | Yıldırım, Hüseyin | en_US |
dc.format.extent | vi, [31] leaves | en_US |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11693/17669 | |
dc.language.iso | English | en_US |
dc.rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | en_US |
dc.subject | Delegation | en_US |
dc.subject | Regulation | en_US |
dc.subject | Non-cooperative games | en_US |
dc.subject | Bertrand competition | en_US |
dc.subject | Cournot competition | en_US |
dc.subject | Product diiferentiation | en_US |
dc.subject | Principal | en_US |
dc.subject | Agent games | en_US |
dc.subject | Efficiency | en_US |
dc.subject.lcc | HD50 .Y55 1995 | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Delegation of authority. | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Oligopolies. | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Competition. | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Cooperation. | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Industrial management. | en_US |
dc.subject.lcsh | Industrial efficiency. | en_US |
dc.title | Delegation in a duopolistic differentiated goods market with Bertrand competition | en_US |
dc.type | Thesis | en_US |
thesis.degree.discipline | Economics | |
thesis.degree.grantor | Bilkent University | |
thesis.degree.level | Master's | |
thesis.degree.name | MA (Master of Arts) |
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