This article critically examines the judicial review of immigration detention in Greece. Specifically, it analyzes the inconsistencies in domestic court rulings, particularly in differentiating between asylum and pre-removal detention, as well as between restrictions on and deprivation of liberty. On the basis of an extended review of decisions by Greece's first instance courts and the Council of State, this article argues that the above-described deficiencies in domestic judicial control must be attributed to the system's institutional design. Greece's lower administrative courts are tasked with reviewing the lawfulness of detention orders and their rulings are not subject to appeal. Although this system ensures speediness, it has also allowed the development of an inconsistent and often unpredictable jurisprudence, to the detriment of the effectiveness required by European norms. The article calls for an institutional reform that would allow for higher administrative courts, such as the Council of State, to act as appellate courts and review the constitutionality of detention orders. This would strengthen the ability of national judges to resolve long-standing normative questions about the law. It would ultimately lead to a kind of judicial control that is more coherent and more conducive to human rights protection.