Lexicographic choice under variable capacity constraints
Date
2021
Authors
Editor(s)
Advisor
Supervisor
Co-Advisor
Co-Supervisor
Instructor
Source Title
Journal of Public Economic Theory
Print ISSN
Electronic ISSN
1467-9779
Publisher
Wiley
Volume
23
Issue
1
Pages
172 - 196
Language
English
Type
Journal Title
Journal ISSN
Volume Title
Series
Abstract
In several matching markets, to achieve diversity, agents' priorities are allowed to vary across an institution's available seats, and the institution is let to choose agents in a lexicographic fashion based on a predetermined ordering of the seats, called a (capacity-constrained) lexicographic choice rule. We provide a characterization of lexicographic choice rules and a characterization of deferred acceptance mechanisms that operate based on a lexicographic choice structure under variable capacity constraints. We discuss some implications for the Boston school choice system and show that our analysis can be helpful in applications to select among plausible choice rules.