Signaling bargaining power: strategic delay versus restricted offers

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dc.citation.epage237en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber1en_US
dc.citation.spage227en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber16en_US
dc.contributor.authorBac, M.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T10:38:02Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T10:38:02Z
dc.date.issued2000en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractI study the first-round separating equilibrium of a buyer-seller bargaining game, extended to allow for asymmetric information, strategically delayed offers and offers restricted to a portion of the good. When bargaining is over a consumption good, in equilibrium the “strong” buyer uses a restricted offer if his optimal consumption path is conservative relative to the “weak” buyer. A pure restricted offer may even be a costless, efficient signal. When the good is durable, a pure strategic delay is involved in signaling a strong bargaining position if the discount factor is high.en_US
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2016-02-08T10:38:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 bilkent-research-paper.pdf: 70227 bytes, checksum: 26e812c6f5156f83f0e77b261a471b5a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2000en
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s001990050336en_US
dc.identifier.eissn1432-0479
dc.identifier.issn0938-2259
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/25031
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s001990050336en_US
dc.source.titleEconomic Theoryen_US
dc.subjectBargainingen_US
dc.subjectDelayen_US
dc.subjectRestrictive agendaen_US
dc.subjectSequential equilibriumen_US
dc.titleSignaling bargaining power: strategic delay versus restricted offersen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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