Akaike and the No Miracle Argument for scientific realism

buir.contributor.authorFatollahi, Alireza
buir.contributor.orcidFatollahi, Alireza|0000-0002-0568-0784
dc.citation.epage37en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber1
dc.citation.spage21
dc.citation.volumeNumber53
dc.contributor.authorFatollahi, Alireza
dc.contributor.editorMcCullagh, M.
dc.date.accessioned2024-03-19T05:30:18Z
dc.date.available2024-03-19T05:30:18Z
dc.date.issued2023-08-03
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophy
dc.description.abstractThe “No Miracle Argument” for scientific realism contends that the only plausible explanation for the predictive success of scientific theories is their truthlikeness, but doesn’t specify what ‘truthlikeness’ means. I argue that if we understand ‘truthlikeness’ in terms of Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence, the resulting realist thesis (RKL) is a plausible explanation for science’s success. Still, RKL probably falls short of the realist’s ideal. I argue, however, that the strongest version of realism that the argument can plausibly establish is RKL. The realist needs another argument for establishing a stronger realist thesis.
dc.identifier.doi10.1017/can.2023.21
dc.identifier.eissn1911-0820
dc.identifier.issn0045-5091
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/11693/114921
dc.language.isoEnglish
dc.publisherCambridge University Press
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1017/can.2023.21
dc.source.titleCanadian Journal of Philosophy
dc.subjectScientific realism
dc.subjectNo Miracle Argument
dc.subjectAkaike information criterion
dc.subjectModel selection
dc.titleAkaike and the No Miracle Argument for scientific realism
dc.typeArticle

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