Robust auction design under multiple priors

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buir.advisorPınar, Mustafa Ç.
dc.contributor.authorKoçyiğit, Çağıl
dc.date.accessioned2016-07-01T11:11:26Z
dc.date.available2016-07-01T11:11:26Z
dc.date.issued2015
dc.departmentDepartment of Industrial Engineeringen_US
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of article.en_US
dc.description.abstractIn optimal auction design literature, it is a common assumption that valuations of buyers are independently drawn from a unique distribution. In this thesis, we study auctions with ambiguity for an environment where valuation distribution is uncertain itself and introduce a linear programming approach to robust auction design problem. We develop an algorithm that gives the optimal solution to the problem under certain assumptions when the seller is ambiguity averse with prior set P and the buyers are ambiguity neutral with a prior f ∈ P. Also, we consider the case where the buyers are ambiguity averse as the seller and formulate this problem as a mixed integer programming problem. Then, we propose a hybrid algorithm that enables to achieve a good solution for this problem in a reduced time.en_US
dc.description.degreeM.S.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityKoçyiğit, Çağılen_US
dc.format.extentix, 43 leavesen_US
dc.identifier.itemidB151119
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/30058
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherBilkent Universityen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectrobust optimizationen_US
dc.subjectauction designen_US
dc.subjectmechanism designen_US
dc.subjectambiguity aversionen_US
dc.subject.lccB151119en_US
dc.titleRobust auction design under multiple priorsen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US

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