Delegation in a duopolistic differentiated goods market with Cournot competition

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buir.advisorKoray, Semih
dc.contributor.authorÜnver, Mustafa Utku
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-08T20:12:21Z
dc.date.available2016-01-08T20:12:21Z
dc.date.issued1995
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.descriptionAnkara : Department of Economics and the Institute of Economics and Social Sciences of Bilkent University, 1995.en_US
dc.descriptionThesis (Master's) -- Bilkent University, 1995.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references leaves 22.en_US
dc.description.abstractWe consider the impact of delegation in a Cournotic duopoly with differentiated goods upon the firms’ profit maximization behavior. In an oligopoly, delegation in each firm can be modeled through a specific non-cooperative game. Delegation games in a differentiated goods market with affine demand are studied within the Cournot competition concept where redelegation is permitted in a symmetric duopoly. The following results are demonstrated: The maximand delegated by each primary delegator, i.e. owner of each firm, converges in monotonically decreasing fashion to the true profit function in the absence of delegation costs, and total industry output at the Cournot equilibrium converges in monotonically increasing fashion to some output level. Welfare changes due to redelegation are also considered.en_US
dc.description.degreeM.A.en_US
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityÜnver, Mustafa Utkuen_US
dc.format.extentvi, 31 leavesen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/17668
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherBilkent Universityen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectDelegationen_US
dc.subjectEfficiencyen_US
dc.subjectTheory of Firmen_US
dc.subjectRegulationen_US
dc.subjectNon-cooperative Gamesen_US
dc.subjectNon-cooperative Gamesen_US
dc.subjectCournot Competitionen_US
dc.subjectBertrand Competitionen_US
dc.subjectDuopolyen_US
dc.subjectDifferentiated Goodsen_US
dc.subjectPrincipal-Agent Gamesen_US
dc.subjectNash Equilibriumen_US
dc.subject.lccHD50 .U58 1995en_US
dc.subject.lcshDelegation of authority.en_US
dc.subject.lcshOligopolies.en_US
dc.subject.lcshOligopolies--Mathematical models.en_US
dc.subject.lcshCompetition--Mathematical models.en_US
dc.subject.lcshEquilibrium(Economics).en_US
dc.subject.lcshIndustrial management.en_US
dc.titleDelegation in a duopolistic differentiated goods market with Cournot competitionen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US

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Dept. of Economics - Master's degree