The normative force of certainty: a defense of realism

Date

2021-01

Editor(s)

Advisor

Wringe, William Giles

Supervisor

Co-Advisor

Co-Supervisor

Instructor

BUIR Usage Stats
4
views
49
downloads

Series

Abstract

Crispin Wright, in Truth and Objectivity, introduces his anti-realist paradigm, arguing that discourse about morality can be truth-apt without holding a realist stance. There, he formulates the criterion of Cognitive Command against realism by claiming that moral realism is defensible if and only if it is a priori that any moral disagreement between realists and anti-realists involves a cognitive shortcoming. In this thesis, the methodology I adopt to defend realism is to uphold Wittgenstein’s claims about certainty against Wright’s criterion of Cognitive Command. In so doing, I argue that the disagreement between realists and anti-realists is a kind of deep disagreement over basic moral certainties, which cannot be rationally resolvable. I then investigate the possibility of basic certainties in metadiscourse by referring to the claims about the existence of moral facts in contemporary metaethics. Taken together, I show that the criterion of Cognitive Command works neither in first-order normative discourse nor in second-order discourse about normativity.

Source Title

Publisher

Course

Other identifiers

Book Title

Degree Discipline

Philosophy

Degree Level

Master's

Degree Name

MA (Master of Arts)

Citation

Published Version (Please cite this version)

Language

English

Type