Signalling in the Turkish-Syrian water conflict

Date

1998

Authors

Güner, S.

Editor(s)

Advisor

Supervisor

Co-Advisor

Co-Supervisor

Instructor

BUIR Usage Stats
7
views
21
downloads

Series

Abstract

This paper proposes a simple two-person game of one-sided incomplete information in extensive form to understand strategic choices made in the Turkish-Syrian linkage between water and terrorism. Turkish intelligence established Syrian support of a terrorist group that aims at an independent Kurdish state in eastern Anatolia. Yet, Turkey frequently stipulates the cessation of this support for negotiating with Syria a water agreement over the Euphrates. The game presents Turkey as a player having superior information. Syria is assumed to be uncertain about Turkish preferences with respect to the mutual conflict. This analysis identifies three pooling equilibria indicating that Syrian beliefs do not matter.

Source Title

Conflict Management and Peace Science

Publisher

Sage

Course

Other identifiers

Book Title

Keywords

Degree Discipline

Degree Level

Degree Name

Citation

Published Version (Please cite this version)

Language

English