Towards a better understanding of morally responsible agency

buir.advisorWringe, William Giles
dc.contributor.authorHaghshenas, Roohollah
dc.date.accessioned2021-06-09T12:38:01Z
dc.date.available2021-06-09T12:38:01Z
dc.date.copyright2021-05
dc.date.issued2021-05
dc.date.submitted2021-06-08
dc.departmentDepartment of Psychologyen_US
dc.descriptionCataloged from PDF version of article.en_US
dc.descriptionThesis (M.S.): Bilkent University, Department of Psychology, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, 2021.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references (leaves 45-46).en_US
dc.description.abstractIn this thesis, I defend P. F. Strawson’s distinction of internal-external problems to our ideas of moral responsibility practices. Then, I introduce the problems of superbad people as some serious internal problems. What I call Moral Personality Disorders, like narcissism, and deep-seated racism can be some instances of being superbad. I argue that just being superbad may make blame unintelligible for the blamed person, may make reactions like sadness appropriate to him, and may make blame an obstacle to finding deep roots of his problem and some effective solutions for it. I conclude that these problems prove the need for some substantial modifications in our ideas of moral responsibility. I ground a new account of responsibility based on what I introduce as one’s quality of valuing (QV) and a historical condition of responsibility. The historical condition, I argue, is met through a Responsibility Chain: 1) We are responsible for our actions/choices as much as they are up to our QV at the time of doing them. 2) We are responsible for our QV at any given time as much as it is up to our previous actions/choices. As its negative force, the Responsibility Chain shows that the credit and discredit of our actions/choices cannot go to a self over than, and beyond to, the Responsibility Chain of our lives. The Responsibility Chain also shows why superbad (and supergood) people are some natural results of human nature and how we should react to them.en_US
dc.description.degreeM.A.en_US
dc.description.provenanceSubmitted by Betül Özen (ozen@bilkent.edu.tr) on 2021-06-09T12:38:01Z No. of bitstreams: 1 10397651.pdf: 738224 bytes, checksum: 135de1d5833f666d9be991e577bfed81 (MD5)en
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2021-06-09T12:38:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 10397651.pdf: 738224 bytes, checksum: 135de1d5833f666d9be991e577bfed81 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2021-05en
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityby Roohollah Haghshenasen_US
dc.format.extentx, 46 leaves ; 30 cm.en_US
dc.identifier.itemidB135124
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/76374
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherBilkent Universityen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectMoral responsibilityen_US
dc.subjectBlameen_US
dc.subjectPersonality disordersen_US
dc.subjectQuality of willen_US
dc.subjectValuingen_US
dc.titleTowards a better understanding of morally responsible agencyen_US
dc.title.alternativeAhlaki sorumlu kurumun daha iyi anlaşılmasınaen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US

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