On non-cooperative genomic privacy

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dc.citation.epage426en_US
dc.citation.spage407en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber8975en_US
dc.contributor.authorHumbert, M.en_US
dc.contributor.authorAyday, Ermanen_US
dc.contributor.authorHubaux J.-P.en_US
dc.contributor.authorTelenti, A.en_US
dc.coverage.spatialSan Juan, Puerto Ricoen_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T12:19:29Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T12:19:29Z
dc.date.issued2015en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Computer Technology and Information Systemsen_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Computer Engineeringen_US
dc.descriptionConference name: 19th International Conference, FC 2015en_US
dc.description.abstractOver the last few years, the vast progress in genome sequencing has highly increased the availability of genomic data. Today, individuals can obtain their digital genomic sequences at reasonable prices from many online service providers. Individuals can store their data on personal devices, reveal it on public online databases, or share it with third parties. Yet, it has been shown that genomic data is very privacysensitive and highly correlated between relatives. Therefore, individuals’ decisions about how to manage and secure their genomic data are crucial. People of the same family might have very different opinions about (i) how to protect and (ii) whether or not to reveal their genome. We study this tension by using a game-theoretic approach. First, we model the interplay between two purely-selfish family members. We also analyze how the game evolves when relatives behave altruistically. We define closed-form Nash equilibria in different settings. We then extend the game to N players by means of multi-agent influence diagrams that enable us to efficiently compute Nash equilibria. Our results notably demonstrate that altruism does not always lead to a more efficient outcome in genomic-privacy games. They also show that, if the discrepancy between the genome-sharing benefits that players perceive is too high, they will follow opposite sharing strategies, which has a negative impact on the familial utility. © International Financial Cryptography Association 2015.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-662-47854-7_24en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/978-3-662-47854-7en_US
dc.identifier.issn0302-9743
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/28396
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherSpringer, Berlin, Heidelbergen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47854-7_24en_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47854-7en_US
dc.source.titleFinancial Cryptography and Data Securityen_US
dc.subjectAltruismen_US
dc.subjectGame theoryen_US
dc.subjectGenomic privacyen_US
dc.subjectInterdependent privacyen_US
dc.subjectCryptographyen_US
dc.subjectGame theoryen_US
dc.subjectMulti agent systemsen_US
dc.subjectAltruismen_US
dc.subjectGenome sequencingen_US
dc.subjectGenomic sequenceen_US
dc.subjectHighly-correlateden_US
dc.subjectInfluence diagramen_US
dc.subjectNon-cooperativeen_US
dc.subjectPersonal devicesen_US
dc.subjectSharing strategiesen_US
dc.subjectGenesen_US
dc.titleOn non-cooperative genomic privacyen_US
dc.typeConference Paperen_US

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