Unique offerings: Ideological competition and rebel governance

Abstract

This study examines the factors influencing non-state armed actors’ (NSAAs) ability and willingness to implement rebel governance, with a focus on the group’s ideological distinction from adversaries and the government. We argue that a unique ideology acts as an effective branding tool, enhancing governance success as constituents recognize and align with it. This ideology allows NSAAs to offer a distinct social contract to their followers with minimal risk, fostering strong relationships with their constituents, and hence benefits from such governance. We propose that rebel governance increases when NSAAs are ideologically distinct from other armed factions and the state. We validate our hypotheses using the Rebel Quasi-State Institutions dataset, an original dataset on armed groups’ ideologies, and the Database for Political Institutions for government ideology. This study is the first to explore the link between an armed group’s distinct ideology and its governance capacity in multi-party settings, and offers a novel contribution to the burgeoning literature on group ideology and rebel governance.