Order of limits in reputations

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dc.citation.epage411en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber3en_US
dc.citation.spage393en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber81en_US
dc.contributor.authorDalkıran, N. A.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-04-12T10:56:55Z
dc.date.available2018-04-12T10:56:55Zen_US
dc.date.issued2016en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractThe fact that small departures from complete information might have large effects on the set of equilibrium payoffs draws interest in the adverse selection approach to study reputations in repeated games. It is well known that these large effects on the set of equilibrium payoffs rely on long-run players being arbitrarily patient. We study reputation games where a long-run player plays a fixed stage-game against an infinite sequence of short-run players under imperfect public monitoring. We show that in such games, introducing arbitrarily small incomplete information does not open the possibility of new equilibrium payoffs far from the complete information equilibrium payoff set. This holds true no matter how patient the long-run player is, as long as her discount factor is fixed. This result highlights the fact that the aforementioned large effects arise due to an order of limits argument, as anticipated. © 2016, Springer Science+Business Media New York.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11238-016-9539-yen_US
dc.identifier.eissn1573-7187
dc.identifier.issn0040-5833
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/36899en_US
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherSpringeren_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11238-016-9539-yen_US
dc.source.titleTheory and Decisionen_US
dc.subjectOrder of limitsen_US
dc.subjectRepeated games with short-run and long-run playersen_US
dc.subjectReputationsen_US
dc.subjectDecision support systemsen_US
dc.subjectDecision theoryen_US
dc.subjectAdverse selectionen_US
dc.subjectComplete informationen_US
dc.subjectContinuityen_US
dc.subjectDiscount factorsen_US
dc.subjectIncomplete informationen_US
dc.subjectOrder of limitsen_US
dc.subjectRepeated gamesen_US
dc.subjectReputationsen_US
dc.subjectRisk managementen_US
dc.titleOrder of limits in reputationsen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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