The reappearing act

dc.citation.epage10en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber1en_US
dc.citation.spage1en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber24en_US
dc.contributor.authorAranyosi, I.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T10:05:09Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T10:05:09Z
dc.date.issued2009en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Philosophyen_US
dc.description.abstractIn his latest book, Roy Sorensen offers a solution to a puzzle he put forward in an earlier article -The Disappearing Act. The puzzle involves various question about how the causal theory perception is to be applied to the case of seeing shadows. Sorensen argues that the puzzle should be taken as bringing out a new way of seeing shadows. I point out a problem for Sorensen's solution, and offer and defend an alternative view, according to which the puzzle is to be interpreted as showing a new way of seeing objects, in virtue of their contrast with light.en_US
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2016-02-08T10:05:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 bilkent-research-paper.pdf: 70227 bytes, checksum: 26e812c6f5156f83f0e77b261a471b5a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009en
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s12136-008-0040-2en_US
dc.identifier.issn0353-5150
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/22820
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12136-008-0040-2en_US
dc.source.titleActa Analyticaen_US
dc.subjectAbsencesen_US
dc.subjectCausal theory of perceptionen_US
dc.subjectOntologyen_US
dc.subjectShadowsen_US
dc.titleThe reappearing acten_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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