A genetic game of trade, growth and externalities
| dc.citation.epage | 832 | en_US |
| dc.citation.issueNumber | 6 | en_US |
| dc.citation.spage | 811 | en_US |
| dc.citation.volumeNumber | 22 | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | Alemdar, N. M. | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | Özyıldırım, S. | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2016-02-08T10:45:00Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2016-02-08T10:45:00Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 1998 | en_US |
| dc.department | Department of Economics | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | A genetic algorithm is introduced to search for optimal policies in the presence of knowledge spillovers and local pollution in a dynamic North/South trade game. Non-cooperative trade compounds inefficiencies stemming from externalities. Cooperative trade policies are efficient and yet not credible. Short of a joint maximization of the global welfare, transfer of knowledge remains as a viable route to improve world welfare. © 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. | en_US |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1016/S0165-1889(97)00102-4 | en_US |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0165-1889 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11693/25451 | |
| dc.language.iso | English | en_US |
| dc.publisher | Elsevier BV | en_US |
| dc.relation.isversionof | https://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1889(97)00102-4 | en_US |
| dc.source.title | Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control | en_US |
| dc.subject | Externalities | en_US |
| dc.subject | Genetic algorithms | en_US |
| dc.subject | North/South dynamic trade game | en_US |
| dc.title | A genetic game of trade, growth and externalities | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
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