A genetic game of trade, growth and externalities

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dc.citation.epage832en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber6en_US
dc.citation.spage811en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber22en_US
dc.contributor.authorAlemdar, N. M.en_US
dc.contributor.authorÖzyıldırım, S.en_US
dc.date.accessioned2016-02-08T10:45:00Z
dc.date.available2016-02-08T10:45:00Z
dc.date.issued1998en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractA genetic algorithm is introduced to search for optimal policies in the presence of knowledge spillovers and local pollution in a dynamic North/South trade game. Non-cooperative trade compounds inefficiencies stemming from externalities. Cooperative trade policies are efficient and yet not credible. Short of a joint maximization of the global welfare, transfer of knowledge remains as a viable route to improve world welfare. © 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.en_US
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2016-02-08T10:45:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 bilkent-research-paper.pdf: 70227 bytes, checksum: 26e812c6f5156f83f0e77b261a471b5a (MD5) Previous issue date: 1998en
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0165-1889(97)00102-4en_US
dc.identifier.issn0165-1889
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/25451
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherElsevier BVen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttps://doi.org/10.1016/S0165-1889(97)00102-4en_US
dc.source.titleJournal of Economic Dynamics and Controlen_US
dc.subjectExternalitiesen_US
dc.subjectGenetic algorithmsen_US
dc.subjectNorth/South dynamic trade gameen_US
dc.titleA genetic game of trade, growth and externalitiesen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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