May ı treat a collective as a more means?
| dc.citation.epage | 284 | en_US |
| dc.citation.issueNumber | 3 | en_US |
| dc.citation.spage | 273 | en_US |
| dc.citation.volumeNumber | 51 | en_US |
| dc.contributor.author | Wringe, B. | en_US |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2015-07-28T12:01:47Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2015-07-28T12:01:47Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2014 | en_US |
| dc.department | Department of Philosophy | en_US |
| dc.description.abstract | According to Kant, it is impermissible to treat humanity as a mere means. If we accept Kant's equation of humanity with rational agency, and are literalists about ascriptions of agency to collectives it appears to follow that we may not treat collectives as mere means. On most standard accounts of what it is to treat something as a means this conclusion seems highly implausible. I conclude that we are faced with a range of options. One would be to rethink the equation of humanity with rationality. Another would be to abandon the prohibition on treating as a means. The last would be to abandon literalist construals of attribution of agency to collectives | en_US |
| dc.description.provenance | Made available in DSpace on 2015-07-28T12:01:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 7978.pdf: 312053 bytes, checksum: f9e94b2a6db34a98763a59a074dfd8e0 (MD5) | en |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0003-0481 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/11693/12522 | |
| dc.language.iso | English | en_US |
| dc.publisher | University of Illinois Press | en_US |
| dc.relation.isversionof | http://dx.doi.org/ | en_US |
| dc.source.title | American Philosophical Quarterly | en_US |
| dc.subject | Kantian | en_US |
| dc.subject | Ethics | en_US |
| dc.subject | Formula of humanity | en_US |
| dc.subject | Collective agency | en_US |
| dc.subject | Rationality | en_US |
| dc.subject | Treating as a means | en_US |
| dc.title | May ı treat a collective as a more means? | en_US |
| dc.type | Article | en_US |
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