Alternative futures for the European Union-Turkey accession negotiations

Abstract

This work proposes a simple two-period interaction model to study EU-Turkey accession negotiations. Turkey perceives the EU as composed of two distinct groups with respect to its accession: traditional supporters and objectors. Supporters opt for either cooperation or defection in period one while objectors consistently oppose Turkish accession. Turkey reacts to cooperation and defection in the second period under its perceptions of EU support. Future uncertainties concerning Turkey's accession do not prevent supporters' cooperation provided that Turkey becomes successful in economics, political reforms, and foreign policy. Turkey continues to negotiate not because it appreciates supporters' cooperation but because no supporter defects. Supporters become concerned about the future interacting with a failing Turkey. Unlike impatient supporters that are less concerned about the future, patient supporters oppose a failing Turkey's accession. Turkey then extremely appreciates supporters' cooperation but quits accession process that becomes highly costly.