Un argument probabilistic pentruteza identitatii minte-creier
Date
2009
Authors
Aranyosi, I.
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Abstract
In this paper I offer a new, probabilistic argument for the mind‐brain identity thesis, put forward by U.T. Place, H. Feigl, and J.J.C. Smart in the 1950s. After considering the epistemic, or conceivability based arguments against physicalism, I build an argument to the effect that naturalistic dualism ‐ the view that phenomenal properties do not metaphysically supervene on physical properties, but they are nomically connected – is probabilistically incoherent. The conclusion will be that phsyicalism, in the form of the identity thesis, is almost surely true.
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Revista de Filosofie Analitică
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Editura Universităţii din Bucureşti
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Rumanian