Stability of covers under different rights structures

Simple item page
buir.advisorKoray, Semih
dc.contributor.authorAkbulut, Çiğdem
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-08T18:20:59Z
dc.date.available2016-01-08T18:20:59Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.descriptionAnkara : The Department of Economics, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, 2012.en_US
dc.descriptionThesis (Master's) -- Bilkent University, 20012.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references leaves 40-41.en_US
dc.description.abstractA countryís social welfare depends on Örmsí proÖts and consumersí surplus. Given unions of countries, a countryís aim is to maximize its own social welfare when it decides to enter or exit a union. For examining unions, we use the notion of a cover as elaborated in Koray (2007).We utilize the Öndings of Ilk¨l¨Á · (2010) about the Cournot equilibrium in our setting to examine core stability and e¢ ciency of covers of countries.We adapt di§erent rightsístructures based on; free exit, free entry, approved exit and approved entry introduced by Sertel (1992) to the context of covers, along with introducing some stronger structures and study how stability of covers varies when linkage costs are imposed upon countries.en_US
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2016-01-08T18:20:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 0006305.pdf: 556766 bytes, checksum: 4b5565e45eae691788c64ae53cd38e2e (MD5)en
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityAkbulut, Çiğdemen_US
dc.format.extentvi, 41 leavesen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/15578
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectSocial Welfareen_US
dc.subjectCoveren_US
dc.subjectFree Exiten_US
dc.subjectFree Entryen_US
dc.subjectApproved Exiten_US
dc.subjectApproved Entryen_US
dc.subjectCore Stabilityen_US
dc.subjectEfficiencyen_US
dc.subjectPareto Efficiencyen_US
dc.subject.lccHM741 .A53 2012en_US
dc.subject.lcshIslam and state--Turkey.en_US
dc.subject.lcshSocial networks--Economic aspects.en_US
dc.subject.lcshSocial networks--Mathematical models.en_US
dc.subject.lcshSocial welfare--Economic aspects.en_US
dc.subject.lcshWelfare economics.en_US
dc.subject.lcshSocial choice.en_US
dc.subject.lcshEconomic development.en_US
dc.titleStability of covers under different rights structuresen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomics
thesis.degree.grantorBilkent University
thesis.degree.levelMaster's
thesis.degree.nameMA (Master of Arts)

Files

Collections

Graduate School of Economics and Social Sciences