Majority voting rule and oligarchic social choice rules
Date
2001
Authors
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Husseinov, Farhad
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Language
English
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Abstract
In the first part of this study majority voting rule for two alternatives and continuum agents is characterized. As in the finite agent case, symmetry among agents, neutrality between alternatives and positive responsiveness characterize majority voting rule. In the second part, the relation between T-monotonicity and the group which acts as the oligarchy in an oligarchic social choice rule, is analyzed. It is shown that the minimal coalition for which the social choice rule is monotonic constitutes the oligarchy.
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Degree Discipline
Economics
Degree Level
Master's
Degree Name
MA (Master of Arts)