Submodularity and supermodularity in contest games
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2024-01-04
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This paper presents various examples of two-player submodular or supermodular contest games. Emphasizing the three main elements of a contest model, our examples revolve around situations where (i) contest success function allows for a draw, (ii) winning prize is not exogenously given but rather jointly produced, or (iii) individual effort cost also depends on the rival's effort. We then illustrate how submodularity and supermodularity can be used to study the existence of equilibrium, the order structure of the equilibrium set, and monotone comparative statics in such contest game examples.
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International Journal of Economic Theory
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Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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English