Central Bank independence and financing government spending

buir.contributor.author	Berument, Hakan
dc.citation.epage	151	en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber	1	en_US
dc.citation.spage	133	en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber	20	en_US
dc.contributor.author	Berument, Hakan	en_US
dc.date.accessioned	2015-07-28T11:56:11Z
dc.date.available	2015-07-28T11:56:11Z
dc.date.issued	1998	en_US
dc.department	Department of Economics	en_US
dc.description.abstract	This paper incorporates the effect of the central bank's independence into the government's optimum financing model. When the implications of the hypotheses are tested for eighteen OECD countries, this paper shows that countries with higher levels of central bank independence generate less seigniorage revenue.	en_US
dc.description.provenance	Made available in DSpace on 2015-07-28T11:56:11Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 10.1016-S0164-0704(98)00050-0.pdf: 977602 bytes, checksum: f1f452e202b2eee2aa1391de8c5bf88c (MD5)	en
dc.identifier.doi	10.1016/S0164-0704(98)00050-0	en_US
dc.identifier.eissn	1873-152X
dc.identifier.issn	0164-0704
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/11693/10890
dc.language.iso	English	en_US
dc.publisher	Elsevier BV	en_US
dc.relation.isversionof	http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0164-0704(98)00050-0	en_US
dc.source.title	Journal of Macroeconomics	en_US
dc.subject	Seigniorage	en_US
dc.subject	Policy	en_US
dc.subject	Debt	en_US
dc.title	Central Bank independence and financing government spending	en_US
dc.type	Article	en_US

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