Central Bank independence and financing government spending

buir.contributor.authorBerument, Hakan
dc.citation.epage151en_US
dc.citation.issueNumber1en_US
dc.citation.spage133en_US
dc.citation.volumeNumber20en_US
dc.contributor.authorBerument, Hakanen_US
dc.date.accessioned2015-07-28T11:56:11Z
dc.date.available2015-07-28T11:56:11Z
dc.date.issued1998en_US
dc.departmentDepartment of Economicsen_US
dc.description.abstractThis paper incorporates the effect of the central bank's independence into the government's optimum financing model. When the implications of the hypotheses are tested for eighteen OECD countries, this paper shows that countries with higher levels of central bank independence generate less seigniorage revenue.en_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1016/S0164-0704(98)00050-0en_US
dc.identifier.eissn1873-152X
dc.identifier.issn0164-0704
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/10890
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.publisherElsevier BVen_US
dc.relation.isversionofhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0164-0704(98)00050-0en_US
dc.source.titleJournal of Macroeconomicsen_US
dc.subjectSeigniorageen_US
dc.subjectPolicyen_US
dc.subjectDebten_US
dc.titleCentral Bank independence and financing government spendingen_US
dc.typeArticleen_US

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