A new ex-ante efficiency criterion and implications for the probabilistic serial mechanism

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Date

2018

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Source Title

Journal of Economic Theory

Print ISSN

0022-0531

Electronic ISSN

1095-7235

Publisher

Academic Press

Volume

175

Issue

C

Pages

178 - 200

Language

English

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Abstract

We introduce and analyze an efficiency criterion for probabilistic assignment of objects, when only ordinal preference information is available. This efficiency criterion is based on the following domination relation: a probabilistic assignment dominates another assignment if it is ex-ante efficient for a strictly larger set of utility profiles consistent with the ordinal preferences. We provide a simple characterization of this domination relation. We revisit an extensively studied assignment mechanism, the Probabilistic Serial mechanism (Bogomolnaia and Moulin, 2001), which always chooses a “fair” assignment. We show that the Probabilistic Serial assignment may be dominated by another fair assignment. We provide conditions under which the serial assignment is undominated among fair assignments.

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Published Version (Please cite this version)