Cloning-proof social choice correspondences

buir.advisorKoray, Semih
dc.contributor.authorÖztürk, Zeliha Emel
dc.date.accessioned2016-01-08T18:14:58Z
dc.date.available2016-01-08T18:14:58Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.descriptionAnkara : The Department of Economics, İhsan Doğramacı Bilkent University, 2011.en_US
dc.descriptionThesis (Master's) -- Bilkent University, 2011.en_US
dc.descriptionIncludes bibliographical references leaves 27-28.en_US
dc.description.abstractIn this thesis study, we provide axiomatic characterizations of the well-known Condorcet and Plurality rules via consistency axioms when the alternative set is endogeneous, namely hereditariness and cloning-proofness. Cloningproofness is the requirement that the social choice rule be insensitive to the replication of alternatives, whereas hereditariness requires insensitivity to withdrawal of alternatives.en_US
dc.description.provenanceMade available in DSpace on 2016-01-08T18:14:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 0005051.pdf: 323911 bytes, checksum: e0b031880d5d5118ccb74659baf01cf8 (MD5)en
dc.description.statementofresponsibilityÖztürk, Zeliha Emelen_US
dc.format.extentvi, 31 leavesen_US
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/11693/15203
dc.language.isoEnglishen_US
dc.rightsinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessen_US
dc.subjectSocial Choice Theoryen_US
dc.subjectCloning-Proofnessen_US
dc.subjectHereditarinessen_US
dc.subjectPlurality Ruleen_US
dc.subjectCondorcet Ruleen_US
dc.subjectAxiomatic Characterizationen_US
dc.subject.lccHB846.8 .O98 2011en_US
dc.subject.lcshSocial choice--Mathematical models.en_US
dc.subject.lcshGame theory.en_US
dc.subject.lcshEconomic policy.en_US
dc.titleCloning-proof social choice correspondencesen_US
dc.typeThesisen_US
thesis.degree.disciplineEconomics
thesis.degree.grantorBilkent University
thesis.degree.levelMaster's
thesis.degree.nameMA (Master of Arts)

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