The role of defense companies in nuclear weapon modernization in the United States

Abstract

The United States allocates significant resources to the defense budget every year. The budget has been increasing steadily since Donald Trump’s presidency, and it diverts government resources to spend the money on urgent necessities, like the health system, hunger, and education. Almost 1/3 of this budget goes to maintaining and acquiring nuclear weapons to bolster deterrence. This thesis argues that defense companies in the United States profoundly affect the procurement process for nuclear strategic delivery vehicles through lobbying. The lawmakers, whom these companies lobby in Congress, vote for bills that, in return, benefit the defense contractors. With many other components, this system is known as the military-industrial complex. This thesis aims to analyze the effect of the military-industrial complex on nuclear weapons, an aspect that is often overlooked by researchers and policymakers. Using qualitative and quantitative methods, results show a positive correlation between nuclear modernization programs and the amount of money spent on lobbying by the five biggest defense companies in the United States between 2000 – 2020.